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14. ABSTRACT Although effects-based operations (EBO) is not a new concept for waging war, it is rarely thought of as a methodology that can be applied across the spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives. This paper argues that the EBO methodology should be used as the joint standard to ensure success for America in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. By first analyzing trends in the world's political environment, this paper will show the necessity of harnessing all instruments of national power in an integrated effort to defeat our adversaries. Second, this paper will highlight how EBO has taken hold as the joint standard, although doctrine and training has been slow in documenting progress across the services. Third, this paper will look at the steady development of EBO since Gulf War I while focusing on the lessons learned from that conflict, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Last, this paper will discuss the future of American combat and the prospect for winning America's wars with EBO.					
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Effects-based Operations: Success Across the Spectrum of Conflict

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: SUCCESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The United States currently faces the challenge of having to prepare for operations that range from humanitarian relief in the Tsunami-destroyed regions of the South Pacific; asymmetric conflict in the Global War on Terror currently undertaken to stabilize Iraq; and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula using a more conventional force.

Although effects-based operations (EBO) is not a new concept for waging war, it is rarely thought of as a methodology that can be applied across the spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives. This paper argues that EBO methodology should be used as the joint standard to ensure success for America in both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. By first analyzing trends in the world's political environment, this paper will show the necessity of focusing all instruments of national power in an integrated effort to defeat our adversaries. Second, this paper will highlight how EBO has taken hold as the joint standard, although doctrine and training have been slow in documenting progress across all military services. Third, this paper will look at the steady development of EBO since Gulf War I while focusing on the lessons learned from that conflict, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Last, this paper will discuss the future of American combat and the prospect for winning America's wars with EBO.

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EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: SUCCESS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

“To me, an unnecessary action, or shot, or casualty, was not only waste, but sin.” – TE Lawrence

INTRODUCTION

The United States currently faces the challenge of having to prepare for operations that range from humanitarian relief in the Tsunami-destroyed regions of the Pacific; unconventional warfare in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to stabilize the Middle East; and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula with a conventional force. Combine these operations with the nearly insurmountable expectation that the United States military act quickly and decisively, with near-zero casualties or collateral damage, and the prospect for American success seems impossible. Still today, America is the only country that can respond across the globe to do the right thing at the right time to secure its national interests, while meeting many of the world’s humanitarian needs. Effects-based Operations (EBO) is the method for ensuring the appropriate use of our national assets to accomplish the mission under insurmountable pressure, in a changing world environment.

This paper will describe the effective use of EBO to plan, execute and assess missions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. By first analyzing trends in the world’s political environment, this paper will show the necessity of focusing all instruments of national power in an integrated effort to defeat our adversaries. Second, this paper will define EBO for the joint warfighter and apply its tenants to war and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Last, I will illustrate how the Air Force’s emphasis on EBO since the first Gulf War has propelled the joint community to make EBO the joint standard, as seen in OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Much can be learned from the conflicts we have fought and those currently undertaken, to provide insight

into the types of enemies we will encounter in the future. The enemies that threatened to defeat American world dominance in 2001 continue to seek that objective. It is imperative that the US know its enemy, and train well to defeat him.

TREND ANALYSIS: INSIGHT INTO TODAY’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

As highlighted in the US Quadrennial Review (QDR) in September, 2001, the United States must maintain a military force that can “ensure our allies, dissuade our adversaries, deter our aggressors, and defeat any adversary, if deterrence were to fail.”¹ Trend analysis of the security environment since 9-11 shows why the QDR statement is true. There are six major trends that describe the key characteristics of the world situation that must be considered by American strategy and policy makers. First, America’s geographic position offers diminishing protection, as the events on 9-11 indicated.² It is not a matter of *whether* another terrorist strike will occur on American soil, but rather *what kind* and *what the scope* it will be. Second, the US is not likely to face a peer competitor in the near future, although we must maintain a force capable of fighting such wars as a deterrent. The impact of this trend can be felt throughout the DoD, as force structure changes and transformation intends to shape the military to adapt to any situation that arises. Third, the trend is toward increased American participation in regional conflicts because US interests are at stake. There is no better example than the Middle East today, where the US protects not only its Middle Eastern allies, but precious natural resources for which they are dependent. Fourth, the US military will continue to have the primary role in helping prevent wars, containing conflict, and

¹ Batschelet, Allen W. Effects-based Operations : A New Operational Model? Pg. 101.

² Batschelet, Allen W. Effects-based Operations : A New Operational Model? Pp. 101-103. Trends described in general.

building a stable deterrence.³ Security will always be a primary concern during pre-hostility and post-hostility phases of conflict, so there is no reason to expect diplomats and civilian agencies to carry the ball. But Iraq is an example of how the military will be needed in almost every aspect of post-hostility conflict, from rebuilding infrastructure to humanitarian operations. Fifth, weak and failing states will continue to provide a haven in which non-state actors can operate with impunity to acquire power and military capabilities, thereby increasing the need for American influence in those states. Sixth, we must shape the behavior of our friends and foes to prevent war and preserve peace. Last, the rapid advancement of military technologies is providing the US military new tools and capabilities to counter the threat.⁴ What these trends indicate is a complicated political and diplomatic world where Americans are going to be asked to do more to shape the actions of our friends and enemies, instead of simply put bombs on target. Success across that range of operations requires an effects-based strategy.

WHAT IS EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS?

Although America can no longer rely on overwhelming force, maneuver, speed, and technology to bring its enemies to their knees, the US can synchronize and integrate all of its instruments of national power to effectively attain its national security objectives. To paraphrase former President George H. W. Bush, jointness is the “use of the right force, at the right place, at the right time,” and for the right purpose!⁵

Joint Doctrine

³ Smith, Edward R. Effects Based Operations. pg 111

⁴ Batschelet, Allen W. Effects-based Operations : A New Operational Model? Pg 101-102. Trends described in general.

⁵ Deptula, David A. Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. Pg 23

The Air Force and EBO advocates like Major General David Deptula have been the preaching EBO for over a decade. Finally in November of 2004, Joint Forces Command produced Joint Warfighting Doctrine Pamphlet 7, which provided a common language for EBO. It is still too early to tell whether the services will train to this standard, but at least there is a joint vision being used in the field today. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) defines effects-based operations for the joint warfighter as:

“Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”⁶

Typical of joint doctrine, this definition isn't inherently clear. What is truly important is that EBO focuses at all levels of war; not on the specific weapons used, or even the targets attacked; but rather on the desired effects.⁷ If the US could save lives, ordnance, and money by destroying a single factory vice bombing every enemy airfield and aircraft, it would not only be the fiscally and morally responsible action, but the most effective use of force.

There are literally dozens of definitions and interpretations of EBO. However, the common thread is a need for assessment, planning, and execution with an effects-focused approach. For this reason, one of the primary principles of EBO is regressive planning: the use of the commander's objective as the starting point for planning and assessment. Through the use of regressive planning, operations can be conducted with the highest certainty that a successful mission will result in the achievement of the commander's objectives. JFCOM

⁶ Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command. Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO). 17 November 2004. Pg 2.

⁷ Air Force Doctrine Center. Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power. 17 November 2000.

advocates a four phased approach for translating national security objectives to the lowest levels (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: An Effects Based Approach (JWFC Pam 7)

The key to EBO planning is a clear translation of national objectives to theater commanders (step 1). Second, effects-based analysis is done at the operational level to help determine enemy behavior and required effects to achieve desired theater and national objectives. Third, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) uses that analysis to provide clear intent to the staffs, components, and other support agencies under his command. Commander's intent is what drives course of action (COA) development and helps focus military actions that are integrated with other instruments of power. Finally, the strategic and operational focus upon objectives will be clearly translated down to the tactical level; where diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power can be integrated to produce required effects.⁸ One can see how focusing on the commander's objectives can lay the groundwork for effective enemy analysis, targeting, and execution. The Air Force has long used methodologies like the OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) or FFTTEA

⁸ Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command. Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO). 17 November 2004. Pg 8.

(Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage and Assess) for conducting effects-based operations.

Today, Joint Forces Command has taken similar terminology and simplified it for the joint force.

The EBO Cycle

JWFC Pamphlet 7 illustrates the three major components of EBO as Effects-based Planning (EBP), Effects-based Execution (EBE), and Effects-based Assessment (EBA).⁹




Figure 2: EBO Components

Though interrelated and overlapping, the EBO cycle begins with effects-based planning, where operators seek to promote unity of effort by developing a comprehensive plan that will bring all instruments of power together to achieve the commander's objectives. Sun Tzu's credo, "Know your enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will not fail", yields insight into the importance of EBP. Through effects-based planning, planners work to develop a comprehensive insight into adversary, environment, and themselves.¹⁰ Together

⁹ Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command. Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO). 17 November 2004. Pg 8

¹⁰ Batschelet, Allen W. Effects-based Operations : A New Operational Model? Pg 104.

with the JFC's intent and objectives, they can mold the issues of time-space-force to get the right force in the right place at the right time to achieve the desired effect.

Second, effects-based execution ensures the matching of military tasks or actions to military forces and resources, while harmonizing military efforts with other instruments of power.¹¹ The key aspect of effects-based execution is a continuous analysis of progress toward meeting the desired effects. Should the situation arise where an action would not produce the desired effect, forces would be applied in a different area. For example, F-117s en-route to destroy a command and control bunker could be retasked in flight if intelligence indicates that destroying the bunker would not cut key communications to lower-echelon air defense regiments. Once again, the effects-based approach can save lives and assets as well as limit risk.

Last, effects-based assessment is critical to identifying and measuring progress and ensuring the desired effects are achieved. By using metrics such as Measures of Performance (MOPs) or Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), planners can determine if the action performed actually accomplished the task. As an example, F-15E Strike Eagles can analyze targeting and weapons release parameters to ensure their aircraft and ordnance performed as expected under the given conditions. Intelligence analysts then determine mission effectiveness by analyzing enemy reaction, communications, and behavior patterns. Together, these two pieces of information answer the question: did the mission have the desired effect, and if not, what actions must be taken to re-accomplish the task?

In applying doctrine to operations, the goal is often lost in the translation. So, how are we supposed to use EBO to conduct more effective operations? Proponents of EBO

¹¹ Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command. Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO). 17 November 2004. Pg 16

suggest there are three ways EBO can be used to secure our national security objectives. First, by harnessing technology and integrating all instruments of national power, EBO can be used to defeat the enemy's will to fight and cohesion of his military forces.¹² Second, EBO can be used to attack the enemy's strategy. Last, by conducting effects-based operations, we hope to convince the enemy leadership to make decisions favorable to our goals. Destruction is not the key to success. Rather, shaping the decisions, behavior, and actions of the enemy are the critical factors in defeating the enemy; and we have demonstrated its effectiveness in every conflict since 1991.

Examples of EBO

The United States' ability to conduct effects-based operations has evolved significantly over the past 12 years, where EBO made its biggest impact as a warfighting method during Gulf War I. That evolution is marked by technological advances such as precision-guided munitions, information operations, and network-centric warfare that have enhanced our ability to plan, execute and assess each mission to ensure it achieves the desired effect. Lt Col Joshua Ho describes the six ways that EBO has been used in the past; each lending credence to its applicability in real world operations.¹³

The first example of EBO is as a planning methodology for the conduct of operations. During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), national strategy was integrated with operational objectives. The strength of the planning process was in the fact that each mission was tracked back to the operational and strategic objectives outlined by General Tommy Franks and his staff.

Second, EBO has been described as an effective way to conduct targeting.

¹² Smith, Edward Allen. Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare to Peace, Crisis, and War. Pg. 103-105

¹³ Ho, Joshua. "The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operations". Pg. 6-9

By analyzing enemy capabilities as a system, we can identify and exploit key weaknesses in the system. During OIF, the coalition attacked multiple target sets simultaneously, rather than in sequence, which allowed for desired effects to be achieved quickly and decisively. For example, in attacking the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), the US attacked two major sector operation centers simultaneously to cut command and control of Iraqi air defenses.

Third, EBO has been described in terms of applying all sources of national power to accomplish the objective. By synchronizing the political, military, economic and diplomatic arms of the US government, they intend to overmatch their adversaries and prevent them from accomplishing their goals. During OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, operations to oust Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia were a combined international effort that included sanctions, diplomacy, and NATO military action that ultimately forced the leader to acquiesce.

Next, EBO has often been described as a method to gain “rapid dominance”, a buzz word in a world of military transformation. Rapid dominance is characterized by quick, decisive action to include unrelenting waves of powerful strikes against the enemy. Used in an effects-based methodology, rapid dominance can be achieved by attacking hundreds of targets at the same time to achieve a desired effect. In Gulf War I, a synchronized effort that included TLAMs, maneuver forces, and a myriad of strike aircraft hit targets near-simultaneously, having devastating effects on multiple Iraqi systems.

Fifth, effective communication between the operational commander and his subordinates to minimize uncertainty in a complex operational environment can be seen as an effects-based operation. This is certainly an attribute that every commander seeks to accomplish during mission planning and execution.

Finally, EBO is a critical element of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW). Viewing the enemy as a complex, adaptive system, NCW is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander's intent. The linking of people, platforms, weapons, and sensors into a single network creates a whole that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts.¹⁴ The Common Operational (COP) seen at the Air Ops Center (AOC) exemplifies network-centric warfare, as it shows war planners near-real time information on friendly and enemy disposition, to include shooters, sensors, and support aircraft.

There are many more examples of how EBO has been applied in conflict, but the process is more important than the execution. The fact is that any operation planned, executed, and assessed to achieve the desired effects meet the commander's objectives is an effects-based operation. In looking at Joint Vision 2020, American war planners realize the scope of their responsibility is very broad. From conventional combat to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Americans will plan and execute missions across the spectrum of peace and war. Moreover, all these operations have the best chance of success if an effects-based methodology is applied to planning, execution, and assessment of the mission.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The "American Way of War" has been described as warfare based on either a strategy of annihilation or of attrition and focused on engaging the enemy in close combat to achieve

¹⁴ Department of Defense. *Elements of Defense Transformation*. October 2004. Pg 8.

a decisive battle.¹⁵ However, the events that led to the Global War on Terrorism gave tremendous insight into the types of enemies the United States will meet in the foreseeable future. Terrorists, non-state actors, warlords, and large scale criminals: enemies who do not have the open backing of a nation's government present a huge number of challenges for the US. America's enemies are not ignorant; in fact, they are quite the opposite. Al Qaeda, Al Zarqawi and others, will do everything possible to exploit America's vulnerabilities and avoid meeting them in a conventional, force-on-force battle. The world knows it is foolish to try to match the US conventionally. Instead, they are seeking ways to turn our strengths against us.¹⁶ America must organize, train and plan to fight the unconventional threat. However, will that transformation come at the expense of the country's ability to fight the peer competitor? It must not! The US must always maintain a force capable of fighting our peer competitors such as China, Russia, and to a lesser extent North Korea, where a conventional force and nuclear deterrent are essential. So the question remains: what enemy should the US prepare to fight in the near future, and how should the government prepare to meet their challenges? The answer is: all of the above. By looking at the range of military operations, the enormous task for the US military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power is obvious: from strategic nuclear war to presence operations, the US must be ready to secure America's interests across the globe. (Figure 3).

War: Asymmetric & Symmetric Enemies

¹⁵ Air Force Doctrine Center. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. Pg 20.

¹⁶ Skelton Ike. Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era. Pg. 122.

If the goal of warfare is to compel the enemy to do your will, then the key to defeating that enemy, regardless of its nature, is to defeat his will to fight. In war, the US military must be organized, trained, and equipped as an adaptable force; ready to fight




Figure 3: Range of Military Operations (CNCS Lecture Ops III-3 MOOTW)

any war, from global conflict to regional war, against a symmetric enemy or asymmetric enemy. In symmetric warfare, nation-states fight other nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. Combat is characterized by force-on-force, close combat, and the objective has historically been to physically destroy the enemy's capability to fight. These are the wars that America's military was designed to win: quickly, decisively, and with speed, precision, and massive firepower. But it is the asymmetric threat that seems to give America trouble; and the country's enemies realize it.

In national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses,

attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.¹⁷ In asymmetric warfare, America's enemies look to exploit its weaknesses and attack its strategy. If "the American Way of War" is conventional force-on-force battle aimed to achieve a quick-decisive victory, America's enemies know the only way to defeat them is by forcing the opposite. Through protracted, unconventional, bloody battle that attacks at the heartstrings of society as much as it does the military, today's enemy has learned from past successes. Not only was asymmetric warfare effective in Afghanistan against the Russians, in Ireland and Kosovo, but it is also the only form of warfare the US has ever lost: in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia.¹⁸ To win its future asymmetric battles, the US needs to remember the lessons it learned from defeating the USSR during the Cold War: patience, focus on clear objectives, utilize every segment of the government, and remained focused on being the technological and innovative world leader. Together, these attributes will enable America to deter and contain its enemies, promote peace, and fight effectively to win the nation's wars.

In understanding the changing nature of war, we must not attempt to shape it into something it is not.¹⁹ The reality is that both symmetric and asymmetric enemies will challenge the US and her allies in years to come. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM is a perfect example. A conventional victory against a symmetric foe brought the defeat of a tyrannical Iraqi leader; only to prompt the protracted, asymmetric battle against insurgents and terrorists throughout Iraq. America's forces must be able to fight and win both kinds of battles: to win and keep the peace.

Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW): Investing in the Future

The Global War on Terrorism has proven that the US can no longer sit idly by and wait to

¹⁷ Skelton Ike. Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era. Pg. 122.

¹⁸ Hammes, Col. Thomas X. "4th Generation Warfare". Pg. 41

¹⁹ Hammes, Col. Thomas X. "4th Generation Warfare". Pg. 44

engage the enemy after being attacked. The US must do a better job of shaping and influencing the troubled regions of the world. Through MOOTW, the US has the tools available to shape and influence every region in the world to better secure and protect American interests at home and abroad.

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, identifies 16 types of “other than war” operations (Figure 4). I would argue that the US military is used



far more in MOOTW than in combat operations, but spends a minimal amount of time learning how to organize, plan and train on how to do MOOTW *right*. By applying EBO as the joint standard, this can change quickly, because the characteristics for conducting successful MOOTW operations parallel that of combat operations. In MOOTW, as in war, the keys to success lie in the planning, execution, and assessment: each focusing on a clearly defined and attainable objective. From there, the other principles of war can be used by the team to create the effects that meet the commander’s intent and objective. Using homeland security as an example, President George W. Bush outlined his strategic objectives as: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States,

reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.²⁰ By applying the EBO methodology to Homeland Defense, planners can not only use President Bush’s strategic objectives to plan and execute security operations, tighten borders, control immigration, secure air and sea ports, and fight the

²⁰ Butler, Glen. *Noble Eagle is Not Your Average Operation*. Proceedings. Pg 49.

enemy abroad, but planners must develop measures of effectiveness and performance to gauge progress.

As the US military transforms to meet the asymmetric and symmetric threats throughout the world, every instrument of American power must transform to strengthen its ability to gain and maintain the peace. The peaceful application of power, through deterrence, war prevention, and crisis containment is where the US must improve. This is especially true because the peacetime tasks of war prevention and containment constitute the vast majority of what military forces actually do. In the post 9-11 environment, it is clear we have to deter both our peer competitors and our asymmetric enemies, whose objective is not to avoid conflict, but to create it, and who has little at risk in attacking our homeland.²¹ With effects-based operations, the tools for shaping and influencing our enemies, our peers, our allies and neutral countries are at our fingertips. The evolution of this methodology can be traced back to Gulf War I, and continues to evolve through joint use in OIF and OEF.

CHANGING THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: EBO SINCE GULF WAR 1

“If you infuse the people that work for you with the right mentality and the right vision, they can make things happen. There’s no greater example of that than the fact that you had the kid on the horse talking to the B-52 in the air...” – General John Jumper

On the first day of Desert Storm, we struck more targets than were struck in all of 1942 and 1943 by 8th Air Force during the Combined Bomber Offensive.²² Through advancements like stealth and precision weapons, and a new planning baseline that focuses on effects (Effects-based Planning), the US Air Force was able to utilize breakthroughs in innovation and technology to operate faster, smarter, and more effectively in achieving the

²¹ Smith, Edward R. Effects Based Operations. Pg. 409

²² Effects-Based Operations Briefing, presented by Col Gary L. Crowder, plans director for Strategy Concepts and Doctrine at Air Combat Command March 19 2003

Joint Force Commander's objectives. EBO was utilized to obtain systemic effects, rather than simple destruction.²³ By utilizing EBO, the US was able to conduct parallel operations to hit critical Iraqi target sets, near simultaneously, to achieve desired effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. (Figure 5)




Figure 5: Parallel Warfare. Major General David Deptula.

Although commanders have always *wanted* to achieve desired effects on the battlefield, it wasn't until Gulf War I that technology existed that would allow the US military to plan, execute, and assess with a reasonable level of certainty. Major General David Deptula highlighted post-OPERATION DESERT STORM that there were three reasons that simultaneous attack never evolved to the degree of parallel war demonstrated in the Gulf. First, during World War II, forces had to be massed to compensate for the lack of precise weapons. During Desert Storm, a single F-117 carrying two precision-guided munitions effectively accomplished the same task it took 1500 B-17 sorties in World War II.²⁴ Second, the number of resources required to suppress increasingly effective enemy air defenses was extraordinarily high. And third, there was no operational level concept focusing principally on effects rather than aggregate destruction to achieve military objectives. At the operational and strategic levels of war, American leaders learned from DESERT STORM that decisions

²³ Effects-Based Operations Briefing, presented by Col Gary L. Crowder.

²⁴ Effects-Based Operations Briefing, presented by Col Gary L. Crowder.

on the use of force must be made on the basis of how they can achieve the most effect in accomplishing the Joint Force Commander's objectives.²⁵ Luckily, we have not forgotten those lessons, and today's joint warfighters are implementing EBO in both OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.

Lessons from OIF and OEF

After September 11th, 2001, when the decision was made to strike Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld outlined his goals²⁶: First, make clear to the Taliban that harboring terrorists carries a price. Second, acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against terrorists and the Taliban. Third, develop useful relationships with groups in Afghanistan who opposed the Taliban and terrorism. Fourth, make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations. Fifth, alter the military balance over time to deny the Taliban offensive systems that hampers the progress of the varied opposition forces. Last, provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime. Notice from this list that the United States would be conducting operations ranging from humanitarian assistance, to intelligence gathering, to combat operations. This trend will continue through the GWOT: the US will continue to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, in a single country, and throughout the world. The lessons we take from OEF will help us succeed.

In Afghanistan today, CJTF-18 is executing effects-based operations to achieve the commander's intent and integrate lethal and non-lethal fires to achieve desired effects.²⁷ By utilizing a Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG), CJTF-18 has put into practice the joint doctrine that JFCOM has politely asked the services to implement. And it works! The

²⁵ Deptula, David A. Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. Pp. 23-26 in general.

²⁶ Grant, Rebecca. The First 600 Days of Combat: The US Air Force in the Global War on Terrorism.

²⁷ Herndon, Major Robert B. and others. Effects-based Operations in Afghanistan. Pg. 26

JEWG synchronizes joint fires to achieve the commander's objectives. It is about achieving effects, both lethal and non-lethal. For example, in the Effects-based Planning phase, the JEWG uses fused intelligence to identify opportunities to conduct integrated operations along three lines: enable Afghan institutions to thrive, help remove the cause of instability and deny the enemy sanctuary, and counterterrorism.²⁸ Equally as important, the JEWG can now translate the commander's objectives into tactical operations and ensure that each successful operation will translate into helping achieve the objective. Without EBO, tactical successes may or may not have achieved the desired effects set forth by the JTF commander. The lessons learned in Afghanistan were seen in Iraq as well.

General Tommy Franks described the kind of war he US would fight in Iraq by saying, "this war will be characterized by shock, surprise, flexibility, and the employment of precise munitions on a scale never seen before and by the application of overwhelming force." Through effects-based planning, execution, and assessment, the combat operations phase of OIF was exactly what General Franks had hoped for. It lasted half as long as DESERT STORM, and required only one-third as many ground forces to win.²⁹ For the JFACC, the linking of sensors and shooters with the operational planners at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) created unprecedented situational awareness. Technological advances allowed us to integrate space, mobility, strike and information operations into the Actual Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP), and synchronize those enablers with lethal and non-lethal strikes. Over 12 years, EBO has moved the American military away from attrition-based methodologies, and can now win decisively through shaping the behavior of the enemy using information, precision, lethal, and non-lethal fires in a synchronized manner.

²⁸ Herndon, Major Robert B. and others. *Effects-based Operations in Afghanistan*. Pg. 28

²⁹ Ho, Joshua. "Effects-based Operations Equals to "Shock and Awe"? Pg. 1

RECOMMENDATIONS

If learning lessons from the past can give insight into the future, we should realize that our enemy will adapt as we do; and our technological advantage, military superiority, and political strength will not secure our interests on their own. It is in our nature to promote democracy and secure our borders by taking the fight to the enemy. Therefore, we must plan for, fight against, and adapt to the enemy using an effects-based approach. EBO will ensure we achieving the primary principle of war: the objective.

To conduct EBO effectively for the long-run, there are three things the US must do more effectively. First, the US must more effectively integrate *all* instruments of power. Stabilizing the Middle East is a perfect example of how difficult the integration of military, diplomatic, economic, and information arms of the government can be. We must plan, train, and exercise for the joint and interagency war. Second, we must maintain the technological edge. Advances such as precision-guided weapons, satellites, and stealth carried us into the EBO environment. We must maintain the technological lead to ensure our peers and enemies don't level the playing field. Last, the US must do a better job of training, educating, and exercising our soldiers to fight in an effects based manner. Secretary of State Rumsfeld said after successfully defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, "This is not the end; it is not even the beginning of the end, but perhaps the end of the beginning." Joint Forces Command has given us joint doctrine on EBO, and our future depends on its implementation as the joint standard.

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